Welcome and a wonderful day, ladies and gentlemen, dear friends from close and far. I welcome you to another special episode of World Week Daily. The other side, independently, critically well-groomed, on Saturday, on the fourth of October 2025. And we have a very... An interesting guest of conversation, who perhaps did one of the most important interviews of the last week in turbulent times. He spoke for more than three hours with the Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi on the occasion of this year's Valdai Conference. The Valdai Club is the most important political think tank. Russia and every year there will be very prominent international population discussed about the world. Last year I was there myself. This year I could not be there for professional reasons. The happier I am that Fyodor Lukyanov is with us today. Fyodor Lukyanov, to repeat that, best known to you, is the chief editor of Russia in Global Affairs. Das ist eine ganz wichtige Publikation, in der eben strategische... strategist nachgedacht wird über die Welt, über die Entwicklung, über die zentralen geopolitischen Trends. Er ist daneben auch Research Professor, also Forschungsprofessor an der Higher School of Economics in Moskau und ebenfalls Research Director, also Forschungsdirektor beim Valdai Club, Russlands wichtigstem Think Tank. And in this property he has... On Thursday, 19 times in a row, the Russian president is interviewed, so we get to know him in different situations and of course we will also talk to him about it. Now I switch to English, although Fyodor can also speak very good German, but it is more pleasant when we talk to each other in English, especially since my Russian is not available, there is no satisfaction in this area. Hello! Fyodor, great to have you here. I see you have safely returned from Sochi. There have been some drone alarms in Russia, as I've heard. Is that true? Hello, Roger. Thank you very much for inviting me to this show. It's always a huge pleasure to talk to you. Yes, it was a drone alarm, but it's hard to say. It's as normal as possible nowadays in Russia. Unfortunately, it got to be routine since, I would say, since last year, that the Ukrainian side is trying to keep Russian citizens, so to say, in a good shape, to be all the time on alert. And the disruption of some flights. is quite frequent. Sochi, which used to be a city, a place for pretty important meetings, this time Valdai and another meeting with the participation of President Putin, it was not very surprising that they tried to disrupt it. It was not very successful, but yes, my flight, the delay was around three hours, but so what it's fine okay well um you you we're just in the middle of the topics the drones there is a lot of talk about drones also in europe drones all over the place in denmark even in switzerland drones have been viewed can you say something about these drones whose drones are they are these russian drones is the russian president putin covering the airspace of Europe, of the NATO countries, especially with drones these days? And if so, what would be the purpose of all this? First of all, I don't know, because I'm not the drone operator, unfortunately. It might be seen as a very fashionable occupation these days everywhere, but I'm not. President Putin, I asked President Putin this question on Thursday, and I asked him why the hell he sent so many drones to Denmark. He said, OK, I will not do it anymore. So it was a joke. I should explain to our European viewers, because I see that in Europe, the sense of humor is not that strong anymore as before. Seriously, I don't think those drones are Russian because just technically, frankly, I cannot imagine how it can work. It's well known that those drones cannot come from Russia and reach. Denmark or Munich as these days or Paris or whatever. So, okay, let's assume that there are Russian agents everywhere who do it and who send drones to, I don't know, to disrupt something. But frankly, I would be happy to believe that Russian intelligence is that powerful. But unfortunately, I don't believe it. I'm rather modestly respectful vis-à-vis certain services in Russia. So, seriously, I don't know whose drones they are. Sometimes looking from here, we don't know many details, but it looks like a craziness, a real madness, because to imagine that all those objects which come from nowhere and then disappear. But they do exist, and they disrupt flights and a lot of other things. It sounds like a bad movie, actually. It's like a stand-up comedy. So I don't know. Maybe some cases may be true, but, of course, they might... be generated by anybody. It's not that difficult nowadays. But en masse, I don't think it's... It's rather, from my point of view, again, I might be wrong, but it looks like a moral hazard, like a panic, which is a product of a pretty specific, pretty strange political atmosphere in Europe which emerged because of Again, I would dare to suggest that the reason is not Russian aggression, which is being blamed for that. The reason is that the general situation in Europe is getting less stable in general. I mean, socioeconomic situation everywhere, actually. We see that the governments are facing enormous troubles. And in this atmosphere, somebody might try to... just divert attention from real problems to something else. And the other thing, maybe if some bad people feel this public atmosphere, which is inclined to be suspicious, then they use it for their own purposes. I don't know. There is one argument which is floating around. You would say it's not a totally panic argument, it's more of a rational argument. I've seen it. They say, well, Russia is trying to expose the vulnerability of the air defense of certain NATO states, especially Poland, in order to prevent them to send these systems to Ukraine. And this is interpreted in Europe as a sign of definitive weakness. on the Russian side, they're saying Putin is in so much trouble in Ukraine that he has now to put his drones into the Polish airspace in order to prevent the Poles and other countries, Germany, etc. from sending even more weapons to the Ukraine. What are you saying to these kind of theories? You know, with such theories, Such theories are very strong because normally they are extremely logical. You put arguments and it's absolutely obvious that of course it should be like this. And by doing that you... basically made proof anything. Seriously, first of all, as I said, unfortunately, I don't believe in that level of sophistication on the Russian side, that big strategic or tactical thinking, which is turning strategic, how to prevent Europeans from doing that in order to do something else. My experience shows that when you try to subscribe very deep thinking to different state bodies, normally you are wrong. Be it in Russia, in the United States, in Switzerland, wherever. And second argument, you know, to prevent Europeans from sending something to Ukraine. As I know, there is not an abundance of what Europe can send to Ukraine even without Russian prevention. And, of course, no doubt that we are now at a very important point when it comes to this conflict, both on the Russian side, on the Ukrainian side, on the European side, on the American side, differently. And in this regard, I rather... interpret this development as a very clear indication that the tension is growing, which is not good at all, which is bad. In Russia, we have particular elements of problems because of economic sanctions, because of prolonged war, and so in Europe, obviously the same, because of some socioeconomic problems and necessity to support Ukraine without enough stuff for that. On the side of the United States, there is a very unclear agenda setting, but it looks like Donald Trump still wants to take distance from that in different forms. Previously, recently, he tried to make a peace deal. Now he tries to... how to say, to provoke parts to continue fighting, but without the United States, and so on. So, to make a long story short, in general, this drone hysteria and the drone stuff is not good at all, as a sign of a situation which demonstrates no ways how it can be resolved. those interpretations, what is happening and why, I don't believe them. And so probably we will learn that at some point or not. It's a symptom of growing tensions, as you say. I mean, they are interpreted, of course, in the European views. If you look at the German newspapers, German politicians, you're all familiar with these statements. They're saying this is the proof, the final proof that Russia is taking this war. into NATO. Even a Swiss chief of our armed forces, Thomas Süssli, he said in an interview today, he said, we are not in war, but we are no more in peace either. So this is seen as Russia, the prelude of Russia attacking Europe and NATO. And there the question arises, how do you see the strategic objectives of your president of Russia? Is this the goal? Is this, let's say, a new stage of escalation which Putin had in his mind from the beginning, restoring the Soviet Union, etc., etc., etc.? So what is the strategic goal of Russia? Could you explain that? Restoring of the Soviet Union, that was an absolutely artificially created idea which did never exist in Russia, never, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, for different reasons. At some points it was out of any agenda. At some points it was contrary to the agenda because Russia in 2000s, for example, fiercely tried to get integrated into the greater Europe system. Later on, some people started to dream about not restoration of the Soviet Union, but increased influence in the space of the post-Soviet. Never it was anything which serious persons in the Russian leadership, in particular President Putin, considered as a realistic development. Soviet Union has gone. Soviet Union will never reemerge. Some people might be very sad about that. But even those understand that that has gone. And there's another long discussion about Russia, how it is changing inside. But I would dare to say that if we hypothetically, as a fantastic scenario, that suddenly the restoration of the Soviet Union would, for some reasons, become a possibility. I'm not sure that majority of Russian people would say that we want those territories back. all of them or a big part of them for many reasons. The transformation of Russian society is not a topic which we'll discuss today. As for strategic goals which are a bit closer to the reality, I would say we discussed it, Roger, we discussed it several times with you, and I can only repeat the same. Putin's agenda... has never changed since February 22. And it is still in place today. What has changed? Some circumstances surrounding this agenda, in particular when it comes to territories which Russia controls or wants to control. Because the initial aim for this campaign which was called Special Military Operations, not by accident. It was an attempt to make quickly some demonstrative moves to convince people in Ukraine, but primarily in the West, that Russia is serious about what Russia asked for before the beginning, about the discussion of security arrangements. Yes, Ukraine was the core of that for several reasons, but in general it was about security arrangement of the post-Cold War Europe. Since even after the beginning of the armed stage in 1922, no one could imagine in Europe or in the United States at that time to ask... to discuss with Russia those issues. And if you remember, you certainly remember, the goal proclaimed after Russia started this war operation, the goal proclaimed in Europe and in the West, especially in Europe, was we need a strategic defeat of Russia. The so-called Istanbul Process. the negotiations first, which started in Belarus and then continued in Istanbul in February, March 2022, was an attempt by the Russian side to get those what it wanted in terms of security arrangement in this area and to stop war, to stop, not to continue. to get it by negotiations. It didn't work for several reasons. It failed. Since that, the agenda setting, I think, changed from this short, robust operation to push the counterpart to accept some new demands. towards a prolonged attrition war, because since Russia realized that no one was eager or interested to discuss it, okay, then we will need to get it by force. And there came territorial questions and issues, which now seem for many in the West as the key ones, but they were not. And still now, I think the territories per se are not deciding. They unfortunately, now it plays a very important role. But still, the key issue is the same as before. And this is not the question to Ukraine. It's mostly a question to NATO and to... to the West. And so coming back, sorry for this long answer, coming back to your initial question, Putin is trying to destabilize NATO in order to get it, to show that NATO is unprepared for war. At the same time, Russia is unable to continue in Ukraine and tries to. I think it's absolutely out of picture of reality, because we know war once started, afterwards it's very difficult to control it. And now the logic is not a very long-term one. Rather, a long-term goal is the same, to achieve the different security situation around Ukraine and Eastern Europe. But the day-to-day situation might change all the time. And to those suggestions that Russia is trying to... escalate in order to hide the failure in Ukraine, I think it's absolutely crazy ideas. That's something which demonstrates the strategic thinking in the West is absolutely fantasy-like. So what you're saying is that one can and should rule out that Russia is like trying or planning to attack further countries for territorial gain and expansion of its power sphere. This can be ruled out. This is a wrong perception of the strategic thinking of the Russian leadership. Not completely wrong, because as... commentator and scholar in international relations, I remember all classical writings and theories which state that this willingness to increase, to widen the sphere of influence, that's a normal thing. That's how politics work. National politics works since, I don't know, ancient Greece. Of course, having said that, I understand very much, and everybody understands, that the complexity of today's world shows that this expansion of influence does not mean necessarily military expansion of the territory. More than that, sometimes it's harmful to the expansion of influence. So in this regard, of course, the whole discussion about... um, um, yeah. Security arrangements means, to some extent, creation of a zone which is in between, the buffer zone, whatever you can call it. Because the main impetus why Russia, at the end of the day, exploded and started this operation was that all claims that we... will not tolerate NATO coming closer and closer to our mainland, so to say. They were disregarded completely. So now when Putin speaks about security zone in Ukraine, which is beyond borders, which Russia proclaimed as its official territory according to the amended constitution, this is exactly this. So we need... some space which would, from very classical military point of view, which would separate us from the potential or real enemy. And in this regard, yes, it is about some spheres, but of course it's not about big geopolitical shifts like an empire restored and another empire defeated. No, it's simply unavailable. What would you say does Putin want at the end? When is he satisfied? If we try to put that in very simple terms? That's of course very risky to say because we those who believe that we understand something in the international relations we were live demonstrated who we were several times. how insignificant we are. But I think, coming back to my previous point, I think that, in fact, Russian Putin's claims never changed from the beginning of the crisis, which began before February 22. It began in November, December 21, when Russia formulated those claims to NATO. And I think that... In his case, in the case of President Putin, he really means what he says. He means the territory which is legally Russian according to the amended constitution, which means the whole of Donbass, and those things with neutral status for Ukraine and limitations on military capacity of Ukraine. be it its own military capacity or the capacity which can be delivered from the West. That's it. Then you can discuss a lot of nuances or details which might be even more important than the main core of this, but still. And I don't think that the ambitions of President Putin are much bigger than that. He, at least before, he is in place for quite a while. And we know that he is not an adventurer. He is a pretty patient, realistically-minded statesman. Realistically-minded means that he knows the real capacity of the country. And I think that his sarcastic response... which he repeats all the time, and this time when we spoke on Valda, it was again, this sarcastic response to suggestions that Russia might try to attack NATO in order to conquer Europe. He knows best that it's absolutely impossible. And that's why when he says that, I cannot understand how they can believe that. That's very sincere in my view. He said, calm down and sleep well. Okay, calm down for sure, sleep well. I'm not convinced it can happen, but yeah. In the European Union, the strategic goal now seems to be, if we listen to Friedrich Merz, if we listen to Macron, if we listen to Kirsten Armer, they say Russia should not be allowed. a military victory in Ukraine. We cannot allow this. This would stimulate the appetite of the monster in the Kremlin. And it seems that they are now motivated or even fired up by this famous post of Donald Trump when he said Russia is a paper tiger. So the rhetoric in Europe goes, Russia can be. defeated on the battlefield. Russia is in deep trouble. Putin is under immense pressure on the home front. He's actually, I'm just slightly overdoing the point, he's basically fighting for his own survival and victory is close. When we persist in Europe, we can and we must defeat Russia on the battlefield. What do you say to this perception? What's your comment? My comment would be it's absolutely unrealistic perception because if Europeans, European institutions or particular countries, particular leaderships would seriously consider to defeat Russia on the battlefield, without direct involvement. I think it's out of question. So Russia, there is not a big secret that Russia would love to gain more and be, I mean, on the battlefield and be more successful. Of course, many people here are not happy that the special military operation, the gas, slower than they would love to. But still, it's... quite obvious that Ukrainians only cannot achieve it. Then the question, does it mean when European leaders say what they say, does it mean that they are ready to get involved to go and fight Russia in Ukraine or somewhere else? You know it better than me. I didn't visit Europe since quite a while. quite a long time. But I doubt that people in Europe and especially and also leaders in Europe really mean that they need to participate in the direct military confrontation with Russia, especially given the fact that the position of the United States and President Trump in particular is ambiguous. So the post in the Truth Social, which you mentioned about the paper tiger, created at the first moment a euphoric feeling in Europe and in Ukraine because, okay, yes, at last Trump made a U-turn, said that Russia is a paper tiger and Ukraine can win everything back. But after a short while, people started to think a bit deeper. What did Trump mean? And now it looks like what he did mean was actually he tried to provoke both sides, to provoke Russia by saying that you cannot do... I am disappointed. You cannot do things, guys. You are paper tiger and it's not a serious military power. Show something. And the same, but the opposite with Ukraine and Europe. You are strong. You can. Yes, we can. Yes, you can. And actually, that's a way to encourage fighting. But the only thing Trump said about his American participation was that, of course, we will sell arms to you. Yeah, no, no doubt we will support you. And then the question arises, well, is it really so that if Europe will be part of war with Russia, that the United States will participate as well? Not necessarily. So at the end of the day, my reading of Trump's position at this point, which might change, we know that Trump is a pretty dynamic person, to put it mildly, his position is what he said before, actually. If we cannot stop guys in the garden fighting each other, let them fight. They will be tired, and then they will stop, and then they will come to do something. Probably he means that. Of course, this position is pretty risky, because in the tense atmosphere, which we discussed earlier, something can happen which would unleash the chain of events which afterwards no one would be able to control. And then again, Europe will be hit anyway. United States, who knows? It depends on them. So, you know, let me say it this way. In case of undesirable negative development, Europe will have no choice but to fight, but to get part of the extremely dangerous game. United States will have a choice whether they decide to participate or not. And they will decide. That's the difference. I think it's a very important difference. US will decide for itself. Europe will not decide. Europe will just follow the flow of events. And Trump also said, which caused even a little bit of panic, especially on the side of the Poles in Poland, because they were seeing it clearly. he wrote, with the support of the European Union, you can win, which means we don't have anything to do with it. I mean, it's no problem to defeat Russia. And if you don't, it's your fault. It's not the fault of the United States. I mean, in the United States, there have been some commentators who said that's rather cynical of the American president because the United States are still seen as the leader of the Western world. And he's basically saying, well, Russia cannot be taken seriously as a military contender. So you can beat them. If you support Ukraine, it's not our business, basically. That's the core message, right? Yeah, it looks like this. Of course, as I said, Trump can change his mind. And around Trump, we see different persons with different views on that. But in general, so far, Trump is a person who... Putin said it almost openly in our conversation. We don't need to pay attention to each word Trump says, because he is the master of his words. He gives words and he takes words. But otherwise, if we disregard those contradictions step by step, the line is pretty linear. He doesn't want to engage. He understands that he cannot disengage completely, at least at this stage. But he's trying to minimalize, to rationalize the engagement, to minimize the engagement. And yes, indeed, as you said, I think if Europeans will try and fail, then he'll say, oh, to death. I mean, you mentioned the Russian president several times. You have been in conversation with him on Thursday in many hours. I mean, how does it work when you interview the Russian president? Are you discussing the interview in advance? Do you have a chat, the fireside chat, before you meet him in a small room and you exchange some nice teas and some small talk? Or how do we have to imagine the process of interviewing the Russian president? You did it for the ninth time now. First of all, it's not exactly my interview with the Russian president, because there is a meeting with 140 approximately persons from the whole world. You were there last year, so you saw how it works. And I ask questions and some questions myself. And I guide the discussion. So I pick up. persons in the room. There are, of course, many of those who want to ask. No, we don't have any conversation before. Very short. I meet him and then I say goodbye to him. Of course, some ideas about the main lines of the discussion. are being discussed with the president's staff. They sometimes, not every time, but sometimes they pass some wishes from him, what things he would love to explain. Normally, it is something which people from the audience will ask anyway or want to ask anyway. Sometimes, um I ask issues which are vitally important, and obviously that everybody would love to listen to that. But I would dare to say I never participated in something like this in other countries, but I don't believe that there is any comparable format anywhere else in the world. No leader would... be able and interested to have three and a half, four hours spontaneous, their own conversation with very, very different people and different questions. So in this regard, Putin is pretty unique. And I can say it's fact of life. I don't try to please the president this time. Last recent conversation. was maybe the most positive out of all I participated. In what sense positive? Positive in the sense he was not aggressive, he was not nervous, he was very nice, actually, vis-à-vis everybody. He didn't want to... Sometimes previously, in previous years, I saw him in a more, so to say, exultated mood, and he wanted to hit and he wanted to respond to it. Not this time. At the same time, he was very energetic. Very energetic. Because before, some years were much calmer, so he was less engaged. This time he was very much engaged and he was really willing to talk. After almost four hours, he said to himself, maybe it's time to end, and then he continued. And then it was like, you know, you visit your friends and you know that it's time to go. but you still keep talking and so on. And it looks like he, inside him, so in his mind and his soul, he has absolutely no doubts that he does right things. Everything what is happening is in line with the historical trends. The world is going to a certain direction, and what Russia is doing, what he is doing, is part of this. It's not contrary to the flow. It's like in harmony with this flow, which does not mean that everything will be successful. But this is, to use the American phrase, which I hate, but it can be used here. He believes... He never said it, fortunately. He believes that he is on the right side of history this time. Americans believed before they were on the right side of history. Now he thinks differently. But Putin is convinced that what he is doing is necessary in order to be prepared for the future. Very interesting. What would you say after the conversation you had? What is this main historical trend he has in mind? when he says that? What is the law of history? I mean, I would use it, you know, like this, because I'm not the determinist. I don't believe in the laws of history. But if you say if he's in on the right side of history, what is his view of the historical reality at the moment, which he thinks he's in line with? And of hegemony? Impossibility to restore hegemony without discussing is it good or bad, but just the fact. Increasing diversity of everything, including cultures, ideological models, ways to confront things, and so on. Much less stability in the world. much more turbulence, including pretty harsh confrontations on all levels and in different parts of the world, which means that you need to be prepared for that, to be prepared basically for anything, because anything can happen nowadays. And when he speaks... speaks, I think in his speech, not in the conversation, but in the speech, when he tried to describe this multipolar or polycentric world, just in points, bullets, five or six bullets, he said actually that this environment per se is not good or bad, it's just a new context. And then what is the context? The context means actually it's much more open, much more flexible, much less predictable. And in this regard, it's the antidote, the opposition to the liberal world order. Again, it's not about what is better, what is worse, but it's exactly the opposite. What does he understand when he says the liberal order? What does he mean with that? I think he means this hegemonic structure of the international system. End of history. Yeah, and... Libyan, liberal capitalism, American style will be the dominant system all over the world, more or less the same as we have it in the West. This will be the universal... Exactly, universalism. Universalism as the aim. And he is exactly on the other position that the less universal, the more stable at the end. Not on the way, but at the end. What is the polycentric world that everybody finally understands its own interest? And that was quite interesting what he said about Trump. He said that we basically disagree on everything when it comes to international problems and so. But first of all, he's frank. He's not hypocritical. And that's true. And secondly, we believe and we know that he is. pursuing US national interests as he understands them. Rightly, wrongly, that's not our business. That's how the elected president of the United States understands the national interest of the United States. And if so, and he is pretty tough, pretty hard in pursuing that. And from Putin's point of view, that's fine. But of course, then we will do the same, that you have this understanding of your interest. We respect it. We can try to find common ground if we can. But us too. We know what we want and how to do it, and we will not listen to you what our interests are. And I think it's quite interesting, clear explanation, which is, for me, it's quite... It's obvious, but in the context and the framework of the liberal world order, it's something which should not be. So that's the conceptual thing. Interesting, he said in his speech, and I think also in your Q&A session afterwards, he was speaking of the renaissance of diplomacy. The return of diplomacy, the return of the need to talk to each other. There will be more conflicts, more insecurity, which means we have to engage diplomatically with each other. We have to try to understand what is the other's interest and we have to find compromises and solutions. Can you say something about this, what he means with the renaissance of... diplomacy because many observers in the west would say i mean this is totally ridiculous how can he speak of diplomacy he has just entered he has violated the the borders of a foreign country with tanks which is the opposite of diplomacy i mean probably in some quarters of the west they would not be willing to listen to him when he says something like that could you probably elaborate a little bit on that, the renaissance of diplomacy. I have no doubt that in many constituencies in the West no one will listen, no one will try to understand what did Putin mean. It's quite normal. We know that from the very beginning. He started to try to explain things to them from the very early period, very early stage of his rule. beginning of 2000s when he started to get engaged in very intense diplomacy. And his main message, which he repeats now as well, but at that time it was in much more constructive and polite, nice form. The message was, guys, you need to understand if you do something, if you push the button, so then something will follow, something will happen because of that. It's like it works in this way. And it's obvious that it's... of course, why to question this? But for the West at this, at that point in the atmosphere of the end of history and so, it was like... At least very strange statement. Because that was the key problem. Because Putin tried from the beginning, be it ABM Treaty, be it NATO enlargement, be it attempts to play games with the post-Soviet republics, starting with Ukraine and then you name it. He tried to say that you should not believe that it will not find a response sooner or later. But it didn't work. It didn't work at all. Because the position was, I remember, reaction to the Munich speech by very esteemed Western politicians and people from the US Congress. 2007. Yeah, 2007. And it was on the one hand, that was a shock. How dare you? At the same time, they said, okay, we feel your pain, collapsing empire. You lose your previous might. Okay, let's be patient. Russia will gradually fade out from this stage. And now he basically demonstrated that this interconnection between some... actions and consequences does exist. When he talks about diplomacy, he means that, yes, violation of borders. If somebody would say that it's the first time in history that some big country dares to do it, I would doubt. Because if we look at the history, that's actually... especially in Europe, by the way. That's any century, if we look back, any century, borders changed profoundly, completely. Why should the 21st century with the exemption now? I don't know. But actually, the real diplomacy, classical diplomacy, is needed when something happens, when crisis happens. And yes, we can... have different views, many views on what happened between Russia and Ukraine, but it happened for reasons which we discussed now. And so what? Then the dilemma, the choice is between strategic defeat of somebody, Russia or maybe Ukraine, or diplomacy. Because the previous stage was the liberal world order stage, what, from my point of view, almost destroyed diplomacy. It might sound very cynical. I'm not a very cynical person, but I need to say it. Demoralization of everything. You cannot have diplomacy when you first put moral etiquettes, moral... assessments, labels, yeah, on sites. Because if you do so, if you say this is an evil, this is the right side of history, how you can compromise with devil? You can't. This is a good European Christian tradition, so you should find the devil. And that's it, that's over. But if you cannot win, if you cannot the deliver a strategic defeat to the devil. So what? What next? Then the devil wins? It's not good either. And I think that was the main issue. If we look at several conflicts after the Cold War, in Europe, like Yugoslavia and disintegration, in the Middle East, in Africa, all the time, somebody would be seen as the side which should win morally and the side which should lose and accept the moral superiority of the other. Again, you might have different views on that, but diplomacy cannot work in this way. Yeah. Moralism is the opposite of diplomacy. And, of course, diplomacy comes out of realism, and realism is also the opposite of moralism. So it's a different, you could say, a different framework that you have discussed in your conversation with the Russian president. And can you say as probably some... some personal observations you have mentioned already a few of the the presence he had in the room what was your personal impression of of president putin um all over you've seen him nine times now in these circumstances in different circumstances would you say i mean he's it's a long time he's in power what's your again your your observation there is he in what shape in what What kind of... Of course, it's unfair to me to jump to big conclusions because, okay, four hours on the stage is a long time, but not enough. I can just have a comparative research or compare him at different points in, say, I I think the first conversation was 2017, so it's eight years, so nine times. He is now more energetic than he was, for example, three, four years ago. Because three, four years ago, it was a feeling that he started to be a little bit, fatigue, a little bit tired, not anymore, not at all. He is less emotional because he used to be, especially sometimes, not recently, but say previous decade, a couple of times, he was much more emotional. He tried to say things to convince. Now he's not trying to convince. I think he's deeply... He's firm in his own belief, and he's not in the mood to deliver, to save souls of others. Okay, so to say he offers his perspective, but if you don't take it, it's your business. Again, I already... discussed it earlier, that he, to some extent, he's a fatalist. He believes in the fatum, and he believes that the fatum is on the Russian side. If so, if I'm not wrong, then we can go back to discussions which were, for example, very vocal around the Alaska meeting. What compromises Putin is ready to make. And I tried to say to all journalists, for example, who asked me, the foreign journalists, you know, it's a wrong framework. To talk about compromises in this framework is not completely, it's not relevant. Putin doesn't see it. in this way. He really believes that there is a setup of issues which absolutely should be solved because this is the existentially vitally important security interest of Russia for the future. More than that, I would even dare to suggest that he believes that this is his historical duty. Next generation will not be able to do it for many reasons, including they have a different experience, they completely grew up in a different situation. Because Putin's generation, baby boomers, in our Russian context, it's really unique. They experienced such a profound shift. Basically, all of them, they live two lives, different lives. Like before the collapse of the Soviet Union and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. They correspond to each other, but not entirely. And that's why I think he saw... so convinced, he sees it as his historical duty to settle this issue for Russia, the Ukrainian issue for Russia. I can, for example, compare his appearance this year with what we had three years ago in October 22. That was probably the worst period for Russia on the battlefield when Russia suffered here heavy losses lost herson and part of harkov region that that was really some people here were scared that this war would end up with really strategic defeat and it was involved a meeting and of course everybody was very very curious very eager to see him and he came and he was as calm as as positive as possible. Absolutely, no exaltation, no emotions, no aggressivity. And some people in the room, they asked me after that performance, tell us, does he understand what is happening? Does he know? And I said, from my point of view, he knows everything, but this is how he sees it. He sees it as a very bad moment. Okay, shit happens, then other comes. Three years after, we can say that he was right at that point. But I remember that episode because of this. I think at that time it was even stronger that he was absolutely convinced that whatever happens, it should be done. Interesting. And what have been observations of this year's Valdai Club, others from that, other statements, the whole mood of the Valdai conference, what was in your eyes the most interesting aspect of it, the most interesting statements. Has Foreign Minister Lavrov been there too as last year? Has he come this time also? Yes, he was there. I wouldn't say he, that was a closed meeting, so I cannot discuss in details, but he didn't say anything revolutionary. He just explained some people asked about particular aspects of Russian foreign policy. He explained if we try to summarize the mood, I would say not the planned recession with Putin, but the conference per se. From my point of view, it was pretty rich in substance. despite the fact that I'm in charge of organizing this scientific, the substantial program, I must say that not every year is very good. Sometimes we had some failures. This year not. I think it was interesting for many people. And, you know, after 22, because before 22, of course, Valdai was mainly Western. half of foreign guests were from Europe and the United States. After 22, for a while, it was totally non-Western. Now we start to regain balance, but not coming back to the pre-22, because now we have, which I think is extremely important, we have a discussion where really different views are represented. from Africa, from the Middle East, from China, from India. Vocally and clearly some people from the United States, some people from Europe. And this is not as before. There's not a polemics that democracy, non-democracy, we explain, we will let me tell you this. No, no. This is now much more about Just a normal discussion. Western views, non-Western views, Russian views, sometimes converging, sometimes diverging, sometimes even confronting each other. But it's normal. And in this regard, I think this is really one of the achievements of us as organizers that we managed to not just to get all those views represented, but to get all those views just... Interacting with each other without major collisions. Important. Let me go back to some very quick to wrap our conversation up. Let me go back to some realities in politics now and then current developments. There has been the you could say after the freezing of Russian assets, the German Chancellor Merz has said, okay, we take this Russian assets, these billions, and we pay them directly. We depropriate it and we give it directly to Ukraine. What is the Russian reaction to that? What is to be expected from the Russian leadership in reaction to these measures of the West? You know, of course, in the West, people used to say that Putin is extremely brutal against the Western economic interests in Russia, for example. But this is not true. because being here we see how cautious our government is to not to harm interests of those business partners who are not eager to destroy ties themselves. There are some many who left after February for different reasons. Some of them wanted to leave, some of them were forced to leave, but anyway. And now, of course, the interest remaining there are pretty big still now the european in particular european european japanese a little bit now the south korean uh russia is not in the rush to get rid of them but of course in case of confiscation and taking away russian assets which I guess will happen at the end, because I don't see other sources for financing this policy of Europe. There is no other money available. Then I guess that those interests, economic interests, remaining economic interests in Russia, of the Western, of European companies, European countries will be taken as well. How big are the economic problems right now in Russia? We hear, we read that the strains are bigger, that the economic mood is not as good as, for example, one year ago. What can you say about this? So, I'm not a big specialist. I cannot, I'm not qualified to give a deep assessment. The general observation, first of all, in Day-to-day life, you see some changes which are not very positive when it comes to prices, for example. But in general, no big, no profound changes yet. We cannot say that the life of Russian people has deteriorated or changed very seriously because of what is happening. Having said that, of course, no doubt that sanctions and all those measures taken They are not good for economies. It's quite obvious. And in the long run, I think Russia will need to pay big efforts to overcome problems caused by sanctions now and sanctions which can be imposed later on. I would say that what is important for our conversation? Expectations. In the West, in Europe, we spoke about this at the beginning, that the mood in Russia will deteriorate so much, and people will start to suffer so much of economic misery and problems, that they will start to put real pressure on the government to end something, to stop military campaign, to reestablish relations with the West. It's not the case at all at this point. At all. Will it be growing in the future? Who knows. Of course, as I said, economic pressure works much less than the West would love, but it is. It has impact, of course. In respect of this, what you're saying is this relaxed attitude you described with President Putin, that he's not trying to convince that he seems to be at peace with what he thinks and that he's on the right side of history, he's reading events correctly. Is this a view that a huge majority of the Russians would have too? Do they think, do they see it the same way? do they think that our president, the Russian president, is on... You know, is in line with the historical trends? Is not totally in opposition to reality? Would the majority of the Russians see it that way too? Yeah, most likely I can confirm what you suggest. Putin is still very popular. And yes, indeed, the majority of Russians would say if asked that that his line is Correct. It's right. It does not mean, of course, that the same majority of Russians would love to continue fighting forever. Those expectations and those hopes that it will end up with some result are there and they are growing. No doubt about that. But the question is, Is it a situation when people would like to stop all current activities at any price, so we need to stop it? No. The expectation is that it will be at the end a solution, a negotiated solution. But of course, the basic frame, the basic guide of what Russia... wanted to get and what Russia believes is absolutely fair, we discussed it, the security change, that should be preserved. There is one more important thing we have to discuss, mention shortly, is what the negotiator Kellogg said on Fox television, where he said, well, the Americans are allowing... the Ukrainian government to attack targets deep in Russian territory. And there is even a talk about Tomahawk missiles delivering to Ukraine. Tomahawk missiles, this means 1500 kilometers of range plus 900 kilogram of TNT of explosive matter. You've discussed this with the president as well in your conversation. Is this a game changer of the war in Ukraine? What kind of concerns do the Russians have if the West, if the Americans will deploy these kind of weapons in combination with the license to escalate geographically, you could say, to Ukraine? First of all, I doubt that it will happen, especially license to escalate. As we discussed, already. Trump is not the guy who would love to get deeper and deeper involved in this crisis. Who knows? But at this point, I don't believe that he would be. He's using that as a card in the bargain, but maybe not ready to make this war his war and not Biden's war, as he used to say. If it happens, I don't believe it will be a game changer on the battlefield. It will be bad. It will be harmful not so much to the Russian army fighting in Donbass, but of course it might hypothetically reach people far away from the war zone, which is happening already now, but it will be bigger. But still, in this regard, of course, the more people hit by the war, the more tense mood in the country. But it might generate just the opposite perception than expected in the West. People will get more angry about this. Not about Putin, but about Americans. Yeah, sorry? As for the situation on the battlefield, I don't think it will be a game changer. because You know, during this pretty long campaign already, from the very beginning, from the very first period, all the time we heard about some wunderwaffe, which would change everything. It started with Bayraktar from Turkey, then Javelin from the United States, then you name it, Abrams, and so on. Never. Even those long-range attack MS and others. Of course, each step of escalation is bad, but it doesn't change anything. I don't believe that the stomach will change militarily. Politically, of course, and Putin said it very clearly, if it will be done, if it will be delivered, it will harm enormously. the prospect of our talk with the United States. No doubt about that. What is causing distress in the Western view? If I read the newspapers, if I'm in conversation with people here, and of course, they know that I've been at Valdai conference, they're always addressing me and saying, but what are you saying? to this very fierce warfare of the Russians. I mean, now they had the discussions with Trump in Alaska, Putin is giving his nice face, you know, he's saying, well, you know, let's find a peaceful solution. And on the other day, there are swarms of drones, you know, in civilian areas in Ukraine, we get all these pictures from destroyed houses, etc, etc, which creates this impression. which is fostered by the media since the beginning of this war, that Russia is doing some kind of annihilation warfare against Ukraine, a warfare of total destruction also of civilian infrastructure. They're going after hospitals. You know, these are like beasts coming from the east, preying upon this small country, Ukraine. This is a very strong perception. Which prevents, you know, even reasonable people here of entering into this kind of discussion you described before, you know, a discussion which would be on a realistic level, on the diplomatic level, not just, you know, putting labels. These are the good guys. These are the bad guys. What are you saying to this perception of inhuman, destructive warfare from the Russian side against civilian infrastructure in Ukraine? Is it a myth? Is it totally fabricated? This is a or is it is there some truth behind it? What's your view? First of all, any war is terrible, absolutely terrible. And the very fact that war wars happen and this war happened, that's a huge tragedy for all for Russians as well. And this is a total failure of politicians or diplomats or the very fact that any country felt need to use military force. And the main problem, the main trouble with any war is that since it started, you have to follow a completely different logic than normally is applied to the peace situation. That means that, of course, no strategy to destroy civilian objects and eliminate Ukrainian people to conduct genocide, nothing like this. But if you start a serious war, if you are engaged in a serious war, especially the current war of attrition on both sides, then you need to destroy, of course, there is a military targets, which are frequently placed inside civilian areas. Because it works in this way. Some plants are in the middle of big cities and so on. Secondly, you need to destroy infrastructure because infrastructure is the main thing to continue war for any country. Russia is trying to do it in Ukraine. Ukraine is trying to do it in Russia. So this energy infrastructure is being attacked here quite intensely. The only way to stop it. At this point, we can endlessly discuss why it started, who was to blame, but that's far away. The only way to stop it is to engage in serious bargaining about the conditions of peace. And I agree with what Putin is saying. And at some point, Trump agreed as well to that. Maybe he changed his mind afterwards, but he said it once, that ceasefire per se in such a big war and such an extended and important war, ceasefire will not stand. will not because ceasefire will be used by by all sides to just to recover a little bit to to to to continue afterwards with the doubled energy so expectations which we hear from from ukraine from Europe and partially from the United States, not from all, but from some people, like General Kellogg, for example, that first ceasefire and then start negotiations. Remember Korea, remember Vietnam, remember some other wars. It does work in this way. Negotiations should be accompanied or no just the opposite the military arms actions should be accompanied by diplomatic political attempts to solve. At the moment, the contours, the framework of agreement will be reached and agreed at least basically. Then it might come to the end of military hostilities. That's terrible, but it's the only way. how again for some peace i was this year at the world economic forum or not the world economy forum the saint petersburg economic forum um where you also had a discussion of the valdai club and i happened to run into a member of the international committee of the red cross i spoke to him and it's i think it's interesting to say what he mentioned. He said, I asked him, is it still true? What your former president, Mr. Maurer, said in an interview with Weltwoche in October 22, when he said that the war in Ukraine, contrary to its description in Western and Swiss media, is a war which is characterized by the restraint on both sides hitting civilian targets. And this will be the actual phenomenon about this war. That's what the President Maurer said in our interview, that the Russians and the Ukrainians are really trying not to cause civilian casualties, which is totally opposite to the trends we have seen in all other wars in the 20th century and also in the 21st century, culminating in the war in Syria. where it was more safe, where it was safer to be in the armed forces, then you had a better chance of survival as if you were a civilian. Would you subscribe to these views? I've just heard, you know, I didn't check it, you know, on the battlefield. I've never been there. So do you think that is true? Is this a war which is totally contrary to the perception we have here, which is actually characterized by restraint regarding the civilian population? I can only listen to what people say, like Mr. Maurer, whom you mentioned, and some others. I heard this a couple of times. We have two parallel conflicts in Gaza and in Ukraine. Just look at figures. I'm not in the position to blame anybody there in the Middle East, but just look at figures. Then you understand a lot. or the way how Americans conducted the Iraq war, for example. It's very much different than Russia and Ukraine do in this conflict. You know, it's difficult to discuss because, again, any war of that scale is a fantastic tragedy. But yes, indeed, we need to be a little bit more realistic about... Again, it's... An attempt to escape moral assessments. It's impossible, of course, we live in the moral world, but at least not to use it as a tool in the political game and just to try to see the real picture. Yes, very interesting and it's so important what you're saying. I want to switch to something we have to discuss about, we have to discuss too, which is the European Union and Europe. You mentioned it before, what would be your suggestion? I mean, you are policy analyst, I don't know whether you're also a policy advisor, you have participated in the World Economic Forum, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, I mean, you have... been in the western world and the eastern world what's your suggestion to to the leaders in the european union especially to starmer mertz and macron what's your advice oh please don't ask me for advice for foreign leaders because i'm not an american person americans are very very keen to give advices to everybody i'm not And I really think that it's not our business to try to advise anybody else. By the way, at the point when Russian leaders tried to do it, for example, in the post-Soviet era after the collapse of the Soviet Union, normally it didn't go well. It's not our capacity and, thank God, it's not our capacity. business. I think that the European Union is in a very, as an observer from the outside, is in a very difficult situation for one simple reason, because it is not the state. Because the state can take sovereign decisions and change the line. The state can make mistakes, even multiple mistakes. But it can also correct them. And that means that, say, United States, China, Russia, India, even the UK, which left the European Union almost 10 years ago, they are much more able to correct themselves. It's not the case with the European Union because it's not a state. but it's not a bunch of different states either. And putting aside all our animosity now, but just a commentator and researcher of political trends, I don't see how Europe, European Union, can correct the way how it behaves with such structure, with such construction, which was a huge advantage before. In the framework of the liberal world order, the European Union was an absolutely great achievement, great success, but the world has changed diametrically. And now the previous advantage is a big burden for everybody. And that's why I believe, one of reasons at least, why the European Union is stubbornly rejecting any attempts to have a meaningful conversation with Russia, about Russia, because they can't. First of all, it's very difficult to agree on anything, to agree on that Russia is an awful aggressor which should be confronted. It's easier, especially initially, to accept that it should be a much more nuanced approach. While you have so many so different countries inside, some of them say that strategic defeat of Russia is the only choice for us. Others say, why should we the hell care about this? So it's impossible. I think that the problem for the European Union is that exactly this. It's impossible to change course. And that's it. And the current course is... as President Trump said in his US speech, is to the hell, political hell. It's not my business to accuse anybody or claim anything. But again, as an observer, I don't see how the European Union will get out from this situation. The European Union claims to be the embodiment of the rule-based order which as you just said is like the liberal world order the one rule the one rule world order according to the western liberal model and the eu is based on that now giving given the the view of president putin that we are entering a multipolar world one could argue that the eu is the ultimate Anachronism. It's doomed to fail because it's unable to adapt to this world. Do you think that the European Union is on the wrong side of history? As I said, I'm very much against this saying and this metaphor because I deeply believe that history has no wrong or right sides. History is holistic. So this is history as it is. But I think, just to say one thing, yes, indeed, the European Union still now sees itself as a guardian of the rules-based order. The problem is that the European Union is the only body which does it. And all the rest, including the United States, which is most importantly, they left this train. And so when you are on the train... which is taking the path to I don't know what, while all others embarked on the other train and went to the other side. That's difficult. And maybe if the European Union would be somewhere else, not in Europe, but somewhere else, it could... create some, as Mr. Borrell said, the fantastic garden without all this bullshit around. But in the case of the European Union, I'm afraid it's not available. This option is not available. And then, yes, indeed, I don't think... And we don't see any persons, forces, parties, institutions in the European Union. who would come with some ideas how to deal with this new reality. More than that, maybe I'm wrong, but I think that, imagine that forces which are very much loved by Trump or especially Elon Musk and Vice President Vance will come to power in Germany, in France, in your country, in Austria, and so on. Do they have a lot of space for maneuvering what to do, how to proceed completely differently? I doubt, because that's the problem, that the integration is very deep. You cannot just say, okay, bye-bye, it's impossible. So, collapse of the European Union would mean a catastrophe of the scale, like collapse of the Soviet Union. And we remember what it was. But at the same time, to continue in the same way as it is now is probably not possible either, especially with the hypothetical change of political leadership. But again, it's not our business. But it's interesting because you argue in your essay, which we printed in Die Weltwoche, about the future of the world order, what is falling apart, the mentality of the people. It's still interesting to see the European Union is based on the idea that the nation-state belongs into the dustbin of history. And President Putin said in his speech in your conference, at Valdai conference, he said, well, what we see now in this world of polycentric world, in this world of insecurity, we have some guiding elements. and the two guiding elements that I see are national interests and traditions, which means it's not only the renaissance of diplomacy, it's also the renaissance of the nation state, which has never been away by the way but still there is the nation state coming back the eu trying to be the opposite of the nation state gets into a very interesting conflict are we seeing now the renaissance of the nation state america first switzerland first russia first china first so would that be an adequate decision description of the world we are heading not Not exactly, for one reason. On the one hand, yes, the national interests-based world is emerging or already emerged. And that's, again, that's the big problem for the European Union, which by default cannot formulate a national interest. But at the same time, having said that, I don't think we can claim that there's a renaissance of the nation state. Because the nature of the nation state is now absolutely different than it was, say, 200 years ago or 100 years ago. The state, the nature of the state, the constitution, the composition of the state, because of migration, because of assimilation or non-assimilation, because of technologies, because of interconnected world and interdependence, which will not go away, whatever you do. Isolationism is impossible. That means that the nation-state in a classical understanding is not available either. And that's the main problem. Because we have a strong legacy of globalization. The liberal globalization is over, but globalization as a factor of interconnection is there. Let's call it free trade. Let's call it mutual trade. Let's call it international relations. It is. You cannot take all these telecommunication means, economic ties, etc. It's there. Logistics. Yes. But at the same time, what you said is absolutely true, that tradition is getting more important because ideologies failed. Communism, liberalism. I'm afraid that the classical conservatism will have serious trouble as well. So So, tradition, whatever you understand in this, the identity-based, not identity as we saw it in the liberal period, that each creature has its own identity and we need to respect it. But the national identity, the societal identity is important again, which again, but interconnected and very much... transparent. You cannot close down each country or community. So, impossible actually. Absolutely impossible. So, we are entering the phase of the so-called enlightened nation-state, which is somehow more interconnected, but still pushed back also to its own traditions, not to lose them. You could also argue it's a bit of a correction of the globalization or of globalism as an ideology. as an ideology, we see a more, yeah, again, enlightened globalism with more weight to the nation state, but it's not like the opposite, which a total, you know, backlash against what we have seen. I think that will be probably a correct summary of it. I mean, we just have to I look a bit on the watch, but it's, I mean, we can continue. We have to speak again about the thing, the relationship between Russia and Europe and Russia and Germany. They have always been very important. I mean, throughout history, you know, when the Germans and the Russians got along, it was good for both countries. Russia is its eagle is looking to the west and to the east. How rotten are these relationships at the moment? And how do you see that? I mean, the future of the relationship of Russia, Germany, Europe, Western Europe, can this change, you know, quickly? Or are we entering a phase of, you know, permafrost, of an ice age of, you know, very long time of bad relations? do you have any intuition regarding this maybe not maybe not permafrost but something close to that For this point, I don't see any chance to relaunch the relationship between Russia and the European Union. Certainly not before the Ukrainian crisis will be over in one or another way. But even after that, two strong feelings on both sides. in particular on the European side, vis-à-vis Russia. And then, by the way, what happened during those three and a half years? United States made Europe much more dependent on America than it used to be. Before Trump, it was Biden's period when the European Union started to clearly be reoriented towards the transatlantic partner. And Trump just consolidated this. And no American leader after Trump, be it Democrat or Republican, will be interested to review this relationship because it's extremely favorable for the United States. economically favorable, politically favorable. So why destroy this? That means that the more this, the less space and room for relationship with Russia, with China, with other countries. Is it in European interest? Again, it's not up to me to judge, but it looks like it makes the space for maneuvering much, much smaller. But anyway. Do you see Western Europe in a... serious decline which could really turn into something very disastrous? I cannot answer this question. So it's really not the position to judge. I think that decline is quite significant. And this is not, as we discussed, this is structural decline. This is decline of the picture of the future. That's the decline. Of course, Europe still now is a pretty prosperous part of the world, and still millions of people would love to live there and not in other parts, even in the rising East. But this lack of the prospect and the lack of the picture of what the European Union will look like, I think that will be increasingly more visible in years to come. And that might create some social and political unrest as well. But again, I don't want to sound as a typical Russian hawk who says that Europe is doomed to fail. Maybe not. But I think that Europeans should be prepared for very hard times. Last year at Valdai, and when I was on a podium, I got into a heated conversation with Maria Sakharova from the Foreign Office of Russia. She's the spokeswoman of Foreign Minister Lavrov and we discussed about Swiss neutrality. I was defending Switzerland against some very harsh criticism, which in my heart, I shared because I also criticise Switzerland's position as far as neutrality is concerned, but I don't do it if I'm not in Switzerland, of course. When I'm outside, I'm defending Switzerland. But I saw that Maria Zakharova was very, she was getting quite heated and quite emotional. And even the day after the foreign minister Lavrov started to address Swiss neutrality and some participants at Valdai conference said that that suddenly Swiss neutrality was the big topic at Valdai, which actually I didn't want. I didn't want to interfere here with the topics or with the schedule. But let's have a look at Switzerland. How do the Russians see Switzerland? How does the Russian government see Switzerland? Because in Switzerland, many people still think in our government, of course, we are absolutely neutral. We do not send weapons. We do not send soldiers to Ukraine. Technically, you know, heuristically law, according to the international law, we still are neutral. But of course, we're participating in the sanctions, etc. Do the Russians, how do they see Switzerland? What's the story there? I would not say that Switzerland is in the middle of our heated debates. It was your achievement that when you came. I'm sorry. Apologies. Yeah. I mean, I didn't come up with it. It was me. I hope you will still invite me to Valdai in the future. It was not my intent to discuss it. I was the victim. of the spokeswoman. Anyway, Swiss neutrality is not an issue. I think the position which is not challenged, which is just perceived as a fact of life, there are no neutral countries in Europe anymore. Neutrality in the previous or non-alignment alliance, freedom from alliances, it's not relevant anymore. the uh status which was inherited from the 90s and 20th century is not applicable now. Yes, there might be some nuances about selling arms, not selling arms, selling arms directly or through a couple of links and so on. But politically, I think the Russian approach is that those who who impose sanctions and engage in support of Ukraine politically, economically, and so on. They are not neutral. And that's it. And that's why all statements, there were a couple of them before Putin-Trump meeting, which finally was in Alaska, but before it was announced, there was a discussion. Also, Zelensky said that it should be in Europe and Vatican or Switzerland. But for Russian side, it's absolutely out of question. Europe at large is seen as a part of the conflict. Inside Europe, it might be some nuances, more hostile, less hostile. But in general, Europe is out of this... from this radar of possibilities at least and switzerland is part of this uh europe my last point my last um question we always end our conversations with the limelight we are with the with the silver lining excuse me at the silver lining at the at the horizon what is the news, what is the development, what is your observation? that makes you cheer, that makes you feel optimistic, that you have seen in recent times? What's the Lichtblick at the end of our conversation? What have you seen in this respect? I'm afraid I don't see a lot of sources for Lichtblick now. As I said at the beginning, when we started to discuss drones, those are signs of significant escalation, at least psychologically. And the problem with the psychological escalation is that it can be easily turned into real escalation. I hope that... But what is the... The darkest night is before the sunrise or something like this. So we are pretty far in this feeling that nothing can be changed. Let us hope that it means that suddenly new horizons will be opened up. Frankly, I don't see them coming. positive and optimistic. No, probably. Everything changing extremely quickly now. Previously, some trends and processes needed years, now they're months. Months, days, and so on. Which means that maybe when we will have our next conversation, then we will discuss a different situation. Let me... Put in one observation I have or have learned from what we have discussed now, listening to what you are saying. I would say one Lichtblick at the end of the tunnel is that we seem to have three leaders on the world stage, the Russian president, the Chinese president probably, we didn't talk about him, and the American president, who seem to have a certain consensus about the direction the world is running which means we have a consensus that there are polycentric power entities there is no more any kind of single block who should think he can rule everything and on this they agree on this multipolar model if we call it that way and this kind of consensus, especially since we have a new leadership in the United States, isn't that something that at least gives the possibility that things could develop to the better in the near future? That they're speaking the same language in some respect and they start to speak again, which was not the case before. Of course, it's... If we look at what was in place one year ago, when still most people believed that Kamala Harris would win the election in the United States, I think the mood in Russia was very, I would not say panic, not at all, but expectations that nothing good can happen. So now it's different. and the very fact how polite President Putin was vis-a-vis President Trump. I tried to provoke him, by the way, a couple of times. No way. He's very firm on sending positive signals to him. The problem is that you're right that they speak the same language, but they speak very different things in the same language. They understand each other. That's positive. Does it mean that this understanding will turn into a conversion of ideas? Not exactly, not necessarily, but there is at least a hope. Because a year ago it was not the same language and no understanding at all. Thank you very much, Fyodor, for this conversation. Extremely helpful, extremely interesting, every time. Thanks a lot for your time. Thank you.